UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG

loT – 2023 - MTECH - uni.lu



New Technology, old risks, IoT (in-)security

Master in Technopreneurship

Threat landscape

2022/2023

Luxembourg CyberWeather (Q3 2022)

Category	Status
Malware	*
Availability	*
Phishing and scams	-
Intrusions	-
Vulnerabilities	
юТ	*
elD	
APT	*


Symbol used	Explanation
0 - 15% of teams indicating this type of incident	÷
16 - 50% of teams indicating this type of incident	
51 - 85% of teams indicating this type of incident	
86 - 100% of teams indicating this type of incident	-

https://www.govcert.lu/en/cyberweather/




Luxembourg Operational statistics

Manual tickets over time O Total per Month Ö Total per Year Total per Month Total per Ð Year 8 2 8 8 6 5 8 8 8 8 8 6 5 8 8 8 6 5








Manual Ticket Classification over time

Date





Manual Ticket by Sector over time

https://www.circl.lu/opendata/statistics/



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Hazard and Threat dimension			$\left(\right)$	Victim Dimension				Consequence	
Threat agent	Artefact Payload	External Transfer Pathway Tool Infrastructure	Point of access		Internal Transfer Pathway		IT Target	Impact	Threat Agent Gain Victim Loss
)					



	Threat Actors Name	Attributed Events 0	Trend
>	APT-C-35	0 + -2	\sim
>	APT-C-36	2 → 0	
>	APT-C-61	0 ¥ -1	\sim
>	APT28	3 13	\sim
>	APT29	0 + -2	\sim
>	APT35	0 v -1	\sim
>	APT36	0 + -2	\sim
	bttoor // o boo	muster (po2 h) (

https://observatory.nc3.lu/



Type of Impact

Various outcomes of cyber threats identified.

Our analysis

The information detected by the monitoring system regarding the type of consequences for the victim is mainly related to scam and ransom demands. The high number of scams is strictly related to the classification of phishing records as scam events. Therefore, the attribution rate of this class remains rather low.

Type of Impact	Attributed Events	Trend 0
Espionage	0 + -3	\sim
Ransom	30 + -14	\sim
Scam	256 141	\sim
Customer Data	1 1	\sim
Data loss, OS / file corruption	0 + -2	\sim
War conflict	8 🗸 -3	\sim

Type of Victim

Diverse sectors targeted by cyber threats during the period.

Our analysis

During this quarter there was a reduction in the number of events detailing the type of victim affected.

Infrastructure	Attributed Events	Trend
Airlines	0 + -4	\sim
Bank	12 + -44	\sim
Communication	0 + -3	\sim
Defense	1 + -3	\sim
Education Institutions	1 + -28	\sim
Energy	0 + -2	\sim
Financial Institutions	0 + -8	\sim

Show more

https://observatory.nc3.lu/

Europe Top threats, majors trends





ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE 2023

July 2022 to June 2023

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-2023

Figure 1: ENISA Threat Landscape 2022 - Prime threats



Figure 5: EU breakdown of number of threats by threat group





Figure 6: Targeted sectors per number of incidents (July 2022 - June 2023)



Europe (main findings)

- > Ransomware and threats against availability ranked at the top during the reporting period.
- Resourceful threat actors have been observed to misuse legitimate tools primarily to prolong their cyber espionage operations. Their aim was to evade detection for as long as possible and obscure their activities by using widely available software from most systems which makes it more challenging for defenders to identify them. Maximizing their chances of success when it comes to an intrusion by not arousing victim' suspicions
- > Geopolitics continue to have a strong impact on cyber operations.
- Several threat actors further professionalised their As-a-Service programmes. They not only used novel tactics and methods to infiltrate environments but also delved into alternative approaches to pressure and extort victims, all the while advancing their illicit enterprises.
- ➤ By Using Extortion Only Techniques criminal organisations have been progressively blending extortion methods that almost invariably incorporate some form of data theft. Double extortion has witnessed a notable rise, with certain groups even relying solely on the act of stealing information.
- Increased operations by law enforcement, such as the takedown of Hive ransomware group's IT infrastructure or Trickbot.
- > Cl0p rose in the first half of 2023 with the weaponisation of two zero-days.
- One of the biggest malware threats is still information stealers such as Agent Tesla, Redline Stealer and FormoBook.
- There is a steady decline in classic mobile malware, with adware remaining in numbers of occurrences the most prevalent threat to mobile devices while in terms of impact spyware can be seen as the most prevalent threat to mobile devices.




Europe (main findings cont'd)

- Hacktivists are increasingly claiming that they target OT environments but public reporting indicate they often overestimate or do not substantiate their claims.
- Phishing is once again the most common vector for initial access. But a new model of social engineering is also emerging, an approach that consists of deceiving victims in the physical world.
- > Business e-mail compromise (BEC, VEC) remains one of the attacker's favourite means for obtaining financial gain.
- The move from Microsoft macros to ISO, Onenote and LNK files is continuing, a shift towards the use of LNK and ISO/ZIP files as well as Onenote files in response to Microsoft's macro changes.
- Data compromise increased in 2023. There was a rise in data compromises leading up to 2021, and although this trend remained relatively stable in 2022, it began to increase once more in 2023.
- There has been a Surge in AI Chatbots impacting the cybersecurity threat landscape. The disruptive impact and the exponential adoption of generative artificial intelligence chatbots such as OpenAI ChatGPT, Microsoft Bing and Google Bard are changing the way in which we work, live and play, all built around data sharing and analysis.
- DDoS attacks are getting larger and more complex, are moving towards mobile networks and IoT and are being used in the context of being used in support of additional means in the context of a conflict.
- Internet shutdowns are at an all-time high. Internet availability threats are keeping up their momentum, especially in the post-covid era, due to the increasing reliance of human activities and society on Internet technologies.
- Information manipulation is a key element of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. Information manipulation has been an essential and well-established component of Russia's security strategies16 17. The number of analysed events for the reporting period has also grown significantly.
- 'Cheap fakes' and Al-enabled manipulation of information continues to be a cause for concern. In the past months, the debate on the use of AI to manipulate information has heated up both within and beyond the circle of industry professionals.
- Threat groups have an increased interest in supply chain attacks and exhibit an increasing capability by using employees as entry points. Threat actors will continue to target employees with elevated privileges, such as developers or system administrators



Europe (threat actors)

Figure 10: Motivation of threat actors per threat category






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




PUT THEM INTO "NORMAL" OBJECTS (LIKE UMBRELLAS, DOLLS, FRIDGES, CARS...)

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TO MAKE THEM SMART! BUT WHAT ABOUT SECURITY?

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MAJOR RISKS OF IOT

- account hijack
- data/privacy abuse
- interception/surveillance
- rogue/''zombie'' devices
- supply chain/SDLC compromise
- massive botnets (e.g. DDoS)
- physical attacks
- human casualty

SOME EXAMPLES

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Photo by Leio McLaren (@leiomclaren) - Creative Commons No known copyright restrictions

MIRAL BOTNET "SMART" CAMERAS

AXIS

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CC)

SMART TOY

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cc

BIOTRONIK CARDIOMESSENGER II SMART PACEMAKER

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CC

HACKING YOURSELF: MARIE MOE AND PACEMAKER SECURITY HTTPS://YOUTU.BE/W1YWPVMPP18

Video: https://youtu.be/W1YWpVMpPi8

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Photo by Orminternal - Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License https://www.flickr.com/photos/145819839@N03

loT

RECOMMENDATIONS (USER)

strong password security secure software/firmware updates Digital First Aid Kit

network segmentation and filtering

physical security MITIGATION check contracts, terms and conditions

• ! if you don't need it don't use it ! LOST & STOLEN DEVICES The Digital First Aid Kit

AND LAST BUT NOT LEAST I IF YOU DON'T NEED IT DON'T USE IT I

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BECOMMENDATIONS (PROVIDER)

• security by design

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR CYBERSECURITY

01010

00101

- sound data collection/mgmt
- supply chain integrity
- check third party software
- comprehensive testing
- security by default
- sound patch policy and process
- comprehensive documentation

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ENISA references

IoT and Smart Infrastructures Tool



Threat Landscape for Supply Chain Attacks



Navigation menu

Threat Landscape for Supply Chain Attacks

This report aims at mapping and studying the supply chain attacks that were discovered from January 2020 to early July 2021. Based on the trends and patterns observed, supply chain attacks increased in number and sophistication in the year 2020 and this trend is continuing in 2021, posing an increasing risk for organizations. It is estimated that there will be four times more supply chain attacks in 2021 than in 2020. With half of the attacks being attributed to Advanced Persistence Threat (APT) actors, their complexity and resources greatly exceed the more common non-targeted attacks, and, therefore, there is an increasing need for new protective methods that incorporate suppliers in order to guarantee that organizations remain secure.

PublishedJuly 29, 2021LanguageEnglish



Download PDF document, 4.79 MB

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/iot-and-smart-infrastructures





Geolocation

SMART & SECURE NATIONAL AWARENESS CAMPAIGN 2021

Conversation recording

lot - 2023 - MTECH - uni.lu Personal settings





CYBERSECURITY LUXEMBOURG

The Luxembourg Cybersecurity Ecosystem

20 years of creating a culture of security for economic and social prosperity

WHERE IT ALL STARTED

"I LOVE YOU" VIRUS (2000)



TOWARDS A CULTURE OF SECURITY

OECD GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURITY OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND NETWORKS (2002)





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
TODAY

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NATIONAL STRATEGY

2021-2025

- Objectives
 - 1. Building trust in the digital world and protection of human rights online
 - 2. Strengthening the security and resilience of digital infrastructures in Luxembourg
 - 3. Development of a reliable, sustainable and secure digital economy
- Governance Framework
- Preparedness & Response
- Education and Awareness
- Research & Development




National Cybersecurity Strategy IV

NATIONAL GOVERNANCE



NATIONAL GOVERNANCE




AUTHORITIES & REGULATORS



Critical Infrastructure Protection CIP • (loi du 23 juillet 2016 portant création d'un Haut-Commissariat à la Protection nationale) LE GOUVERNEMENT DU GRAND-DUCHÉ DE LUXEMBOURG Ministère d'État Haut-Commissariat à la protection nationale General Data Protection GDPR • GOVCERT .။။ CERT gouvernemental Regulation Luxemboura CNPD (loi du 1er août 2018 portant mise en place du régime général sur la protection des données) NIS(2) Network and Information Security • (DORA) GOVCERT (loi du 28 mai 2019 portant transposition de la directive CERT gouvernemental Luxembourg Commission de Surveillance NIS) du Secteur Financier circl.lu PSDC Prestataires de Services de • Computer Inciden Response Center LUXEMBOURG INSTITUT LUXEMBOURGEOIS Dématérialisation ou de Conservation DE RÉGULATION (loi du 25 juillet 2015 relative à l'archivage Institut luxembourgeois de la normalisation de l'accréditation, de la sécurité et qualité des produits et services électronique) PSF Professionnels du Secteur • Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier Financier de Support (loi modifiée du 5 avril 1993 relative au secteur financier) => more on cybersecurity.lu


PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE

PUBLIC-PRIVATE COOPERATION IN ACTION



PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE


PIU CYBER




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EDUCATION & RESEARCH


Education & Research cgié SECURE restena réseau sécurité .lu INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY **INFPC** UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG








A closer look to the national actors









A closer look to the private sector


Companies Start-ups



Protecting & Strengthening the Economy

at national and European levels







National Cybersecurity Competence Centre

- Competence and Capabilities Building
- Ecosystem and Industrialisation
- Research, Data and Innovation
- NCC-LU







FIT4CYBERSECURITY - is a self-assessment tool designed for a non-expert audience to estimate in a general way the degree of maturity of its security posture and obtain some basic recommendations.

This tool can be complemented by:

FIT4CONTRACT, to support business owners in verifying if contracts for the procurement of ICT services cover the essential information security aspects.

FIT4PRIVACY, to provide business owners with a good initial overview of their maturity in the field of privacy and data protection (as required by the GDPR).



TESTING PLATFORM - holds the tools and services that will help organisations to perform basic tests on their most commonly exposed infrastructures, starting with email and web servers. Threat Observatory Platform

TOP - aims to support its users with evidencebased information on cybersecurity emerging threats, in order to facilitate their decision-making processes regarding the prevention strategies to be undertaken.

nc3.lu National Cybersecurity Competence Center

LUXEMBOURG



TRUST BOX - is the ideal toolset to raise cybersecurity awareness and empower all users with better cyber hygiene.



MONARC - is a tool and a method allowing an optimised, precise and repeatable risk assessment.

Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg

- CSIRT (Incident Coordination and Incident Handling)
- Cyber Threat Intel and support tools
- CSIRT NIS











TYPOSQUATTING FINDER is a free and public service to quickly find typosquatted domains to assess if an adversary uses any existing fake domains. You can enter a domain to discover potentially typo-squatted domains. An advanced option allows you to select the algorithms used.



PANDORA is an analysis framework to discover if a file is suspicious and conveniently show the results. You can safely use this free online service to review files or documents received by a third party.

More public services are listed on https://www.circl.lu/services/

CIRCL ALSO OFFERS ACCESS TO PRIVATE SERVICES OR CLOSED COMMUNITIES:



MISP - Open Source Threat Intelligence and Sharing Platform (formerly known as Malware Information Sharing Platform) access is available on request. MISP gives an overview of the current trends of attacks and threat indicators, it is a sharing platform that enables teams to collaborate and provides API access to ingest the information for detection and remediation into the security tools by the organisations.



AIL LEAK DETECTION AIL Project is an open source framework to collect, crawl, dig and analyse unstructured data, like information leaks publicly available on the Internet or Darknet. Organisations in Luxembourg can benefit from the service by being notified based on contextual keyword lists.

LOOKYLOO is a web interface that captures a webpage and then displays a tree of the domains that call each other. Lookyloo can be used to test unknown or potential malicious links safely.



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
URL ABUSE is a public CIRCL service to review the security of an URL (Internet link). Users regularly encounter links while browsing the Internet or receiving emails. When there are some doubts regarding an URL (e.g. potential phishing attacks or malicious links), users can submit an URL for review, and a take-down process of the fraudulent content is initiated.





2015

"Digital security risk should be treated like an economic rather than technical issue, and should be part of the organization's overall risk management and decision-making"



Shaping EU's cyber future



"Team Cyber" for Europe





NIS Coordination Group

CSIRT Network

CyCLONe (Cyber Crisis Liaison Network) The Network (NCCs)

The Community (Research, Academia, Industry & Civil Society)

ECCC mission

- Encourage and coordinate training activities, to ensure that everyone in Europe has access to the university and life-long-learning courses, as well as to motivate young people to go for a cybersecurity career and support efforts that address the gender gap; and
- Increase the global competitiveness of the EU's cybersecurity industry, ensure high cybersecurity standards throughout the EU and turn cybersecurity into a competitive advantage.


- Strengthen EU's leadership and strategic autonomy on cybersecurity by developing the EU's capacities and capabilities of the Digital Single Market;
- Support and foster research, innovation and technological developments, for the resilience of systems, including critical infrastructure as well as commonly used hardware and software;

Digital Europe Programme **Horizon Europe** ECCC 🖸 **Co-investment Co-investment** by industry on by Member States COMPETENCE CENTRE project basis **Network of National Collaborative R+D projects** Capacity building projects **Coordination Centres**

ECCC Instruments

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DIGITAL EUROPE







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HORIZON EUROPE



HE – synergies with other programmes

HORIZON EUROPE

Other Union Programmes, including

Common Agricultural Policy	InvestEU	ESF+	Innovation Fund
External Instrument	LIFE	Digital Europe	Internal Security Fund and Instrument for Border Management
Maritime & Fisheries Fund	EU4Health	Space Programme	
Connecting Europe Facility	ERDF	ERASMUS+	Single Market Programme
Just Transition Mechanism		Creative Europe	Recovery and Resilience Facility

Enhanced synergies

COMPATIBILITY Harmonisation of funding rules; flexible co-funding schemes; pooling resources at EU level


COHERENCE & COMPLEMENTARITY Alignment of strategic priorities in support of a common vision

Joint Actions – SOC

Building/strengthening National cross-border SOCs using multiple intstruments:

Joint Procurement

Grants



ECCC in action

NCC-BE

KNOWLEDGE-SHARING EVENT

8 NOVEMBER 2023 HYBRID FROM BRUSSELS

Cybersecurity Atlas

ECCC 🔳 📊

EUROPEAN CYBERSECURITY COMPETENCE CENTRE ACCESS-2-FINANCE SERIES

9th May 2023: Copenhagen, Denmark #CyberMatchmaking



A knowledge management platform to map, categorise and stimulate collaboration between European cybersecurity experts in support of the EU Digital Strategy.



EUROPEAN CYBERSECURITY COMPETENCE CENTRE ACCESS-2-MARKET SERIES

21 November 2023: Rennes, France #CyberMatchmaking

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Strategic Agenda



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Strategic Agenda

By 2027, the ECCC and the Network will have

funded European SMEs in developing and using strategic cybersecurity technologies, services and processes through a coordinated cascade funding mechanism via NCCs and national co-financing 2. supported and grown the cybersecurity professional workforce in both quantity and quality through the standardisation and certification of cybersecurity skills and investments in education and training

3. strengthened the research, development and innovation expertise and competitiveness of the EU cybersecurity community

#CyberTogether

Fostering collaboration and cooperation, to tackle emerging threats and challenges efficiently, as well as to embrace opportunities for a better, safer futur.

Because only together will we tackle the many challenges of our digitised world, and be able to make Europe strong, competitive and cyber secure.

- Cloud and mult-cloud environment
- Supply chain security
- Infrastructure resilience
- Quantum computing
- Advent of AI and autonomous functions
- Skills shortage and competence needs
- Vulnerabilities of small entities (SME)
- Info sharing & threat intel
- Dual use & the geopolitical context
- Commercialisation of R&D

Thank you for your attention

Questions ?